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1.	 GENERAL
1.1
	 ScoAe
This volume contains emergency procedures, applicable to
potential radiological accidents which may occur during handling, storage,
and transport of the radioisotope thermoelectric generator SNAP-27 prior to
launching. The procedures and limits contained herein are based on stan-
dards of applicable regulatory agencies and on information obtained from other
references cited in the bibliography. The contents of this manual are in-
tended to serve as a guide for the preparation of specific emergency instruc-
 1 activities tions by the SNAP-27 custodia act t s 
1.2	 Responsibility
Each SNAP-27 custodial activity concerned is responsible for
the preparation of its own specific emergency instructions. Specific respon-
sibilities of named individuals will be as specified in such instructions.
1.3	 Description of SNAP-27
	
'	 1.3.1	 General Description. The SNAP-27 is a radioisotope
fueled thermoelectric power supply being developed by the General Electric
	
r _	 Company, for the Atomic Energy Commission. This SNAP-27 generator,
providing a minimum of 56 watts of DC power, will be used as the electrical
power generation subsystem on the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package
(ALSEP) which is being developed for the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center.
The ALSEP is a package of instruments and supporting subsystems that will
be placed on the lunar surface by the astronaut and will transmit lunar geo-
physical information for a period of at least one year after departure of the
spacecraft.
- 1 -I
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The objectives of the Apollo Program are the landing of men on the moon,
limited observation and exploration of the moon by the crew, and return
to earth. In addition to carrying lunar geological equipment and using
this equipment on the surface, the astronaut will set up and activate the
ALSEP which will be left on the lunar surface to transmit data after the
astronauts have left the moon as shown in Figure 1. The SNAP-27 power
subsystem will provide the electrical power for the ALSEP.
Prior to delivery of the flight unit, a total of fifteen full-scale generators
and five mockups will be built and tested. These will be used for gen-
erator prototype development, qualification testing, life testing, astronaut
training, and various system integration tests to he performed by the Manned
Spacecraft Center and its ALSEP contractor. In parallel with the fabrication
and testing of prototype and qualification generators , 'an extensive program
of component development testing is being carried out to fully verify the
design.
The present design weight of the fueled generator asse: y^bly including con-
necting cable and connections is approximately 38.6 pounds. The raw
electrical output of the generator is a minimum of 56 watts .
The design of the fuel capsule heat protection system for the SNAP-27 RTG'
will permit the capsule to survive an abort from earth orbit and land intact
without dispersing radioactive materials within the biosphere. This is the
first aerospace SNAP program where the safety requirements dictate intact
re-entry of the fuel capsule and an extensive series of arc tunnel heat
transfer and aerodynamic tests are being performed to establish the relia-
bility of the re-entry shield configuration.
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Figure 2 indicates the SNAP-27 RTG assembly and Figure 3 
presents mockup
models of the RTG showing fuel capsule insertion with handling tool, the
Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) fuel shipping cask, the fuel capsule handling
tool, and the fuel capsule and generator and plate.'
The SNAP-27 generator will be transported to the lunar surface within the
scientific equipment bay of the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) descent
stage . The fuel capsule (:teat source) will be transported to the moon in
a separate protective, cask, mounted on the LEM vehicle. This fuel cask
will contain re-entry heat shielding which will assure intact re-entry from
earth orbit. Thus, the generator will be transported to the
.
 moon  in an un-
fueled condition. (No electrical poweroutput is required during transport) .
After lunar landing, the ALSEP and SNAP-27 
generator will be extracted
from the LEM by one member of the crew, and carried to a location that
provides optimum p lacement of the equipment and sensors. Generator
fueling will be accomplished either prior to or after final 
p lacement on
the lunar surface and the ALSEP operation will then begin.
The decision by the NASA to fuel the generator on the moon, rather than
to carry a hot (fueled) generator within the LEM scientific e
quipment bay,
was based on the following factors:
a .	 It is difficult t^ provide adequate heat re-
moval for a fueled generator within the LEM equipment bay during the
launch and lunar transit periods when the generator heat rejection fins
have a poor view of space.
x
}	
-4-
l
i
4	 ^ K
t	 iii
C)D
J J Jm
U
^
^
O
V
W
W
W
U
W
J
W
O2
crW
H
W
La.
0
x
W
JD
QR5
WD
W
.c^
a^
c.
0
Cd
a^
c
i
a
zm
N
N
W
AVPOW r
^ J	HW
W 11)	 Z!i'aQ
= V1
-5-
S.
-6-
t	 '^j	 ^,^	 "lJ S	 a	 ^ .	 $
i	 .^^«'!	 f^^.7^t^,^^:.'1i:J1i Y..^..F,. r'►a^S7^^#J,L.. :^^lic. ^.	 .t
iiiii
i
cii
ri
r
a
i
f
N
Q
U
MZiL
n
J
Li
D
L
E
uJ
WH
D QZ JQa
o ^
J tj
vs oc
IL R
a
V Q U
Z
J W
W Z U
p W C
W 0
CO
r..
cd
A
c^
U
UUJ
O
NC9
i
2 ^
J Cz
Z
t M
(1)
W
J	 b)
-r-r
^ w
a
V
JW
m
W
W
J
Q OV
J ^W
D Z_LL J
(Drs aZ Z
3aO=
X F—N _
^3
O ZO
Z W
^.! N
^Z
I
i
I1
	
b .	 Astronaut safety considerations favor the
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handling of a cold generator on the moon to prevent high temperature fin
surfaces from coming into contact with the astronaut's pressure suit.
Thermal surface temperatures of the capsule will present a potential burn
hazard to personnel during all phases of its handling.
c .	 :. , he simplification of the interfaces between
the ALSEP, SNAP-27, and the LEM vehicle, afforded by the use of a
se parately-shipped fuel capsule, permits greater flexibility in design and
stowed equipment arrangement.
Figures 4 through 6 are artist's conceptions of possible lunar handling
and deployment schemes for the SNAP
-27/ALSEP/equipment. Figure 4
shows the removal of the fuel capsule from the LEM fuel cask, which
is mounted outside the scientific equipment bay. The cask is rotated
to the horizontal position and the hot capsule is withdrawn by means of
a fuel capsule handling tool. The radiation from the exposed capsule
is primarily low level neutron and gamma radiation and the maximum total dose
rate will be approximately 54 mrem/hr at 1 meter from the fuel capsule.
Figure 5 shows the removal of the ALSEP equipment containers from the
LEM, while the fuel capsule is temporarily suspended from the LEM
landing structure. A possible packaging concept for one of the equip-
ment containers is illustrated in Figure 6 where the unfueled generator
is mounted to a honeycomb panel that also serves as the lunar mounting
platform. The box structure attached to the base contains other ALSEP
components mounted on the sides and top. After removal of the box, it
could be carried to the final site, thus avoiding an extra trip to and from
L	
.w
I
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IFigure 4. Removal of Fuel Capsule From TEEM Fuel Cask
Figure 5. Removal of ALSEP Equipment Containers
-8-
4K
Figure 6. Packaging Concept for SNAP-27/ALSEP Components
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LEM to obtain the fuel capsule .	 At least 25 minutes are required for the
generator external surface to rise 200 0  above ambient temperature after
fuel insertion, and the fueled package could be carried by the crew member
within this time interval.	 The tool used for the fueling operation (see
' Figure 7) is simple and uses only linear motion for locking and removal.
Since large clearances ,are provided between the fuel capsule and the
generator fuel cavity, a very high reliability can be associated with the
fueling operation.
The high heat rejection temperature of the generates• requires	 that care9	 P
be taken in the placement of heat-sensitive electronic components im-
mediately adjacent to the heat rejection surfaces .	 Large adjacent
surfaces which block the generators view of space also affect its ability
to reject heat and cause a rise in radiator temperature . 	 Objects as large
as the generator itself will cause less than a 10°F rise in radiator tem-
perature if kept at least 2 feet away from the generator.	 Heat input to
adjacent components from the generator can generally be kept reasonably
low by.
v
a .	 A separation distance of several feet,
r:
b.	 Orienting the surface with minimum area towards
the generator (low view factor) , and
r
c .	 Applying a low absorptivity/high emissivity
coating to the exposed surface.
Thermal integration problems between the SNAP-27 and ALSEP on the lunar
surface are expected to be minimal because of the flexibility allowed in<A
equipment placement.
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Figure 7. Fuel Capsule Locking System and Handling Tool
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	1 .4	 Radiological Accident--Definition
Any accident or condition which results, or which threatens
to result, in the escape of radioactive material from the SNAP-27 fuel
capsule shall be considered as a radiological emergency requiring im-
plementation of the appropriate emergency procedures. Internal exposure
of personnel to hazardous amounts of plutonium is considered to be the
tprincipal hazard which can result from a potential accident.
Since the mass of fissionable material in a SNAP-27 fuel capsule is con-
siderably less then (approximately 1/5) the minimum mass required to
achieve criticality under optimum conditions of geometry, and reflection,
and in view of the handling and storage restrictions, the probability of an
accidental criticality is considered too remote to be considered as a hazard
in this manual.
	
1.5
	 Potential Hazards
A breach of fuel capsule integrity and subsequent dispersal of
the fuel as a restut of an impact or of its being involved in a sustained fire
or explosion will result in varying degrees of hazard depending upon the
mode, extent and location of the failure.
1.5.1	 External Radiation Exposure. The dose rates from an
integral unshielded SNAP-27 fuel capsule and other SNAP-27 components are
shown in Table 1 .1 . These are high enough to represent a potential radiation
exposure problem if radiation control procedures are not properly administered.
This hazard is significantly reduced however, if the fuel material is dis-
persed either as ground or air contamination since the principal plutonium
isotopes involved are primarily alpha emitters.
- 12 -
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t TABLE 1.1
TOTAL GAMMA AND NEUTRON DOSE RATES
I FROM-	 E T SNAP 27 COMPONEN SS
Component Mrem	 r at 1 ineter from center
radially axial	 ,
Bare fuel capsule 54 42
Fueled generator 50 42
Capsule in LEM cask 54 42
Capsule in ground shipping
container 20 20
1.5.2	 Internal Radiation ExA =, sure. The dispersal of plutonium
in the air and on the ground and the attendant potential for internal radiation
exposure as a result of an "accident" is considered to be the most serious
hazard.
Internal radiation exposure results from the deposition of radioactive material
within the body by one of the principal modes described below.
(a)	 Inhalation
Inhaltion of airborne plutonium will result in its
deposition in lungs and its subsequent translocation to critical organs. A
cr9N:':cal organ is that part of the body that is most susceptible to radiation
damage under the specific conditions considered and whose damage by the
radiation results in the greatest damage to the i:ody.
The crit i cal organ for soluble plutonium isotopes is bone; the lungs and
gastrointestinal tract are the critical organs for insoluble plutonium. Since
the solubility of plutonium is very low, the lungs and gastrointestinal tract
become principal organs of concern from the standpoint of emergency exposure.
- 13-1
tY'i}AT449j^v'+r^1^}uk"NY':k'M',.^•"-'M^r{iW
	
v. nwwrw.M.^.mvasr..- .ay.v..,.n ,....^.._.....	 -	 . _	 _.. ..___. _ -.... 	 _...
I
(b) Ingestion
The SNAP-27 fuel form is very in7oluble in the
gastrointestinal tract, therefore, only a small percentage of the material
ingested will be retained. This fraction will contribute to the total internal
dose received by the individual.
(c) Inj ection
Plutonium may gain entrance to the body through
wounds and abrasions. This route is a significant potential hazard in terms
of internal exposure..
1.5.3	 Detection. Conventional beta-gamma radiation survey
instruments are of no value in detecting alpha radiation from plutonium. Special
instruments are required to evaluate the hazards associated with an accident
involving plutonium.
(a) Portable survey instruments. The Eberline alpha
scintillation counter, model PAC-4S, having a range up to 2 x 10 cpm; and the
Eberline gas proportional alpha counter, model PAC-4G, having a range up to
x 10 5
 cpm are instruments with desirable characteristics for such measure-
ments.
(b) Laboratory counting equipment: Internal gas flow
proportional counters or alpha scintillation detectors should be used for
assessing the activity levels of smears, air samples, and liquid samples if
required.
Ir
t",	
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1	 1.5.4	 Avoidance of Internal Exposure.
(a)	 Remain upwind and uphill from accident.
	
IL	 (b)	 For those who must enter smoke or contaminated
areas, use the following devices to reduce personnel contamination: (1)
mechanical breathing apparatus (e.g. , air packs, aqualung, etc.) of supplied
^A
air types, (2) dust filter mask; (3) goggles, and (4) protective clothing (e.g. ,
thin plastic coats, jackets, pants, shoe covers, gloves, and hood or surgeons
cap)
(c)	 In building, evacuate area immediately and pre-
vent dispersal by closing windows and doors and by shutting off ventilating
and air conditioning systems.
(d)	 Survey personnel exposed for contamination.
2.	 RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDES FOR PEACETIME EMERGENCIES
N In a strict sense, there is no such thing as a maximum permissible
dose resulting from an uncontrollable exposure during a radiological accident.
tlt Dose limits for normal operations are based on the source of radiation (a, d
subsequent exposures of personnel) being under control.. 	 On the other hand
the source of radiation in a radiological accident. and the immediate dose
' received by persons as a consequence of the accident are not subject to
t
predetermined controls. 	 Protective steps, however, can be taken to control
continuing exposures of the persons involved. 	 The type of and necessity for
protective steps would be based on an evaluation of all factors involved--
such as, nature of the accident, control measures available, number of persons
involved, duration of the exposure, dietary and economic consequences of the
control action, etc.
-15-
1
R'
1
Ar
2.1	 Radiation Workers.
The following recommendations, applicable to radiation
workers, have been made by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (1CRP) .
The maximum permissible doses recommended in this section are maximum
values; however, it is recommended that all doses be kept as low as
practicable, and that any unnecessary exposure be avoided.
2.1.1	 External Exposures.
(a)	 Accidental High Exposure. An accidental high
exposure that occurs only once in a lifetime and contributes no more than 25
rems shall be added to the occupational dose accumulated up to the time of the
accident. If the sum then exceeds the maximum value permitted by the formula*,
the excess need not be included in future calculations of the person's
accumulated dose. Accidental exposure to doses higher than 25 rems must be
regarded as being potentially serious, and shall be referred to competent
medical authorities for appropriate remedial action and recommendations on
subsequent occupational exposure. This is intended as an administrative guide
to permit the continuation of work with radiation, following a bona fide acci-
dent ("once in a .lifetime"), in cases in which interruption of such work, or
curtailment of exposure, would handicap the individual in the pursuit of his
career.
Formula is: Maximum permissible accumulated dose, Rems = 5 (N-18),
where N is the individual's age in years.
- 16
(b)	 Emergency Exposure. Emergency work involving
exposure above permissible limits shall be planned on the basis that the
!
	
	
individual will not receive a dose in excess of 12 rems. This shall be added
to the occupational dose accumulated up to the time of the emergency ex-
posure. If the sum then exceeds the maximum value permitted by the formula*,
the excess shall be made up by lowering the subsequent exposure rate so that
within a period not exceeding 5 years, the accumulated dose will conform with
the limit set by the formula. Women of reproductive age shall not be subjected
to such emergency exposure.
2.1.2	 Internal Exposures
(a) Accidental High Exposure. In the case of an
accidental high exposure to radioactive material where the total intake of
radioactive material exceeds the amount that would result from intake for 1 year
at the maximum permissible levels for occupational exposure to such radioactive
material given in the Report of Committee II (ICRP Publication 2) , an estimate
of the intake resulting from the exposure shall be entered on the individuals
record and shall be referred to competent medical authorities for appropriate
action. Appropriate action should be taken to prevent further exposure of the
individual during subsequent periods of time.
(b) Emergency Exposure, Emergency work involving
exposure to radioactive materials at levels above the normal maximum per-
'	 missible concentrations shall be planned on the basis that the total intake of
*
Formula is: Maximum permissible accumulated dose, Rems = 5 (N-18) ,
where N is the individual's age in years.
- 17
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radioactive material during the emergency period should not exceed the
cumulative intake that would result from exposure for 1 yee.r at the maximum
levels (MPC values) for occupational exposure to such radioactive materials
given in the Report of Committee II (ICRP Publication 2) . If significant ex-
posure to external sources might be expected to occur concurrently, the annual
intake referred to above should be estimated to make allowance for the dose
equivalent delivered by the external sources (ICRP Publication 2, page 24) .
The 50-ye6r integrated dose to the critical organ from such an intake will
not exceed 5 rems for the whole body, blood-forming organs or gonads; 30
rems for skin, thyroid and bone*; and , 15 rems for other organs .
(c)	 Short.Term Exposuies to Radioactive Materials
One or more short-term exposures to radioactive
materials within a period of 13 consecutive weeks are considered acceptable if
the total intake of radioactive material during this period does not exceed the
cumulative intake allowed when exposure occurs for 13 weeks at the maximum
levels (MPC values) for occupational exposure given in the Report of Committee II
(ICRP Publication 2) . If significant exposure to external sources occurs con-
currently, the quarterly intake referred to above should be estimated to make
allowance for the dose equivalent delivered by external sources (ICRP Pub-
lication 2, page 24) . The 50-year integrated dose to the critical organ from
such an intake will not exceed 1.3 rems for the whole body, blood-forming
organs or gonads, 8 rems for skin, thyroid and bone*, and 4 rems for other
organs.
*
The dose to bone is based on a body-burden of 0.1 µCi of Ra226.
a
J.
Al
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NOTE: In applying the recommendations, the objective should be to
minimize exposure as far as practicable and to avoid exposure that is
unnecessary.
2.2	 Members of the Population.
2.2.1
	 External Exposures. For the purposes of this manual,
the external exposure limits for members of the general public during an
emergency may be considered to be:
(a) 15 rem - to children up to the age of 16 years
and pregnant women.
(b) 25 rem - to all other persons.
2.2.2
	 Internal Exposures. From the Protective Action
Guides developed by the Federal Radiation Council for acute contamina^ing
events involving the bone-seekers Strontium-89 and Strontium-90, one may
infer the following to be the maximum permissible doses (MPD) to individuals
in a population group from emergency dietary intake of plutonium:
(a) 10'rems - maximum permissible dose to bone
marrow for first year following the event.
(b) 15 gems - maximum permissible accumulated
dose to bone marrow.
I
NOTE: As an operational technique, these limits may be assumed to be met
I if the average dose to a suitable sample of the exposed population group does
not exceed one-third of the corresponding numerical value cited above.
- 19 -
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For the emergency inhalation problem, the British Medical Research
Council has used a maximum total dose of 15 rems to the lung. These
basic criteria (i.e., primary standards) are used to compute the maximum
permissible total intakes, and, for inhalation, the time integrals of the
concentrations in air following the accident.
2.3	 Contamination Guides .
s
	
	 2.3.1	 Consequences of 238 P Ground Contamination . There is
no level of 238 P ground contamination which represents a point above which
there would be significant radiation problems present and below which there
would definitely be none. Therefore, any single value presented as a 238 P
ground contamination limit would misrepresent the total situation. In essence,
then, any readily detectable 238 P does, at least potentially, represent a
radiological problem of some degree. The magnitude of the problem is very
dependent on the particular situation which exists at the time in question. In
y	 fact a subtle change in the situation at hand could significantly increase or
r decrease the magnitude of the problem. For instance, it appears that a change
from wet-weather to dry-wea-::..ar conditions could increase by orders of magnitude
the concentration of resuspended 238 P in air. Figure 8 illustrates these
aspects of 238 P ground contamination.
(a)	 Resuspension of 238 P
The resuspension factor, K, is defined as:
_ 1	Airborne concentration (units/m3)
K(m ) - Surface contamination (units/m?-)
The value of K applicable to a specific area and at a specific ground con-
tamination level is dependent on the degree of motion occurring, or which will
- 20 -
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'	
	 occur, in the area. An active area for purposes of this report is defined as
any area in which there is movement by animal or man, by foot or in a
vehicle.
In turn, a quiescent area is defined as an area in which there is no movement
by animal or man. The range of K values applicable to an active area is
10 -4 to 10 -6
 and to a quiescent area is 10 -6 to 10 -8 , with vehicular traffic
representing the highest level of activity. Ground contamination levels
versus air concentrations are plotted for this range of possible values of K in
Figure 8.
(b)	 Contamination of Food Crops
Plutonium is not concentrated at any point in man'
food cycle and the transfer through the soil with subsequent uptake by the roots
of plants is insignificant. The only mode of contamination is then direct deposi-
tion onto a field crop. Consequently, the Federal Radiation Council's (FRC)
Category II Protective Action Guide (PAG) of 5 rads to the bone marrow or whole
body of individuals in the first year following a contaminating event would
apply if compensated for the relative insolubility of 238Pu. The term "Protective
Action Guide" has been defined as the projected absorbed dose to individuals in
the general population that warrants protective action following a contaminating
event; and a "protective action" is an action that will avert most of the ex-
posure that would otherwise occur.
The approach taken was to determine as a function of 238 P ground contamina-
tion the daily consumption rate for a period of one .
 year of an idealized con-
taminated food crop which corresponded to the FRC's Category II PAG. The
idealized food crop was specified as having 2 Kg/m 2
 of ground coverage, 20%
of which is edible. It was assumed that 100% of the 238 P is deposited at
f:
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1Least initially on the idealized food crop; the effective half-life of the
238 P on the food crop is 13 days; and, no loss of 238 P during processing
of the food crop occurred.
The results were plotted versus ground contamination in Figure 8. The
results were also compared against dietary data and the following conservative
conclusions reached.
In order for the FRC' s Category II PAG to be exceeded,the following would
probably have to occur:
Range A - Contamination of more than one major food crop.
Range B - Contamination of a major food crop
Range C - Contamination of any food crop.
Due to the necessary conservatism in the assumptions upon which this con-
clusion is based, the three ranges are re presentative of the upper limit of the
radiation problem direct contamination of field crops could potentially cause.
(c)	 Use of Figure 8.
The most significant parameter which can be
determined from Figure 8 is stay tig	 y me, whether it is a matter of hours or weeks,
based on a total dose limit or standard. However, the prudent use of pro-
fessional judgment is essential in any determination based on Figure 8. If two
areas were contaminated to the same level, say 10 4Ci238Pu/m2, in one of which
the only activity is men on foot and in the other there is vehicular traffic, two
different stay times should be determined. In the first area the K selected
should be on the order of 10
-5
 and in the second, on the order of 10
-4 . The
total lung dose per week of occupancy would be approximately 0.9 rem in the
1	 - 22 -
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first area and 7.5 rem in the second area. Using 15 rem as the total dose
limit, a stay time of 17 weeks is determined for the first area and 2 weeks
for the second area. The actual stay time in an srea will be determined at
the time of the contaminating event by taking appropriate air samples and
radiation level measurements, and by -the use of respiratory protection.
2.3.2	 Controlled Areas. The following levels may be used
as a guide in the establishment of controlled areas:
Alpha	 Beta-Gamma
(a) Airborne Contamination	 3.0 x 10-11 1.0 x 10-10
(b) Direct reading surface	 250 cpm	 0.1 mrem/hr
contarination	 100 cm 
(c) Transferable surface con-
tamination (dpm/100 cm2 )	 150	 1 x 103
2.3.3	 Respiratory Protection. Following is a guide for
respiratory protection from airborne contamination:
Levels (4Ci/cc)	 Respiratory EQu12ment Required
Alpha	 Beta-Gamma
< 2 x 10 -12	 < 3 x 10_
g
	None
3 x 10 -9 to 1.5 x 10 -8 	Half face respirator with
mechanical filter.
2 x 10 12 to	 1.5 x 10 -8 to 7.5 x 10 -7 	Fuli face respirator with
1 x 10-10
mechanical filter.
>I x 10 -10	 > 1.5 x 10	 Supplied air respirator (scott
air-PAC or positive pre s-
sure hood or suit)
*Note - Consider external radiation exposures in these cases.
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2.3.4
	 Skin Surfaces. Following are maximum permissible
contamination guides for skin surfaces:
Direct Survey
	 Transferable (Smear)
Alpha (dom/l00cm2) -O-Y(mrad/hr) 	 a, 0;Y
(a) General	 150	 <0.06	 None Detectable
(b) Hands
	 150	 <0.3
	 None Detectable
2.3.5
	 Clothing. Following are maximum permissible con-
tamination guides for clothing.
Item
Shoes, contamination zone:
Inside
Outside
Direct Survey
a	 ^, Y
(dpm/100 cm 2) (mrad/hr)
Transferable (Smear)
a	 s, Y
(dpm/100 cm2 )
300 1.0 30 1,000
300 2.5 30 11000
Shoes, personal:
Inside
Outside
Clothing, contamination zone:
Clothing, other company issued,
and personal
300
	
0.3
	
30
	
1,000
300
	
0.6
	
30
	
1,000
150
	
0.75*
150
	
0.25
*
No 100
-square inch area to average greater than this value.
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2.3.6
	 Items. Following are permissible contamination
guides for items given a radiation or contamination clearance,
, except as
otherwise stated;
(a) No smearable a contamination above 54µCi/100 cm 2 .
(b) 75 dpm/61 cm  a measured with PAC-4G instrument.
(c) 0.1 mrem/hr 0 with G-M survey meter.
(d) 450 µ4Ci/100 cm 2
 smearable S y contamination.
3. PRE-PLANNING FOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
3.1
	 Time Divisions for
_	
Planning.
For the purposes of this manual, two general periods are con-
sidered;
it
	
	
(a) Immediate Emergency Period -- the period of time
from the occurence of the radiation accident to the effecting of appropriate
radiological controls. During this period, the required immediate actionss for
radiological safety purposes and for emergency care and necessary hospitaliza-
tion of injured individuals are carried out, and an operational program for the
post-emergency period is prepared. This manual is primarily concerned with
the procedures for the immediate emergency period.
(b) Post--L:,^ergency Period -- the period following the
immediate emergency period.  General guidance for- the post-emergency period
is contained in Section 8 below.
3.2	 Development of Individual Plans i:,K% Qustodial Activities .
As indicated in paragraph 1.2, each SNAP-27 custodial activity
shall prepare an emergency plan specifically applicable to it. Such a plan of
action shall integrate res ponsibilities of management, health physics and
- 26 -
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medicine. An activity not having a Radiological Safety Officer shall appoint
a trained and qualified individual to this position. The plan shall identify
individuals by name, as applicable. Assignment of responsibilities in such
a plan may be as indicated below. Overall guidance for the preparation of
emergency plan may be obtained from the contents of this manual
	
3.2.1
	
Management. The responsibilities of management
include:
(a) Mobilizing auxiliary help for medical and Health
Physics teams.
(b) Taking necessary action in event of fire and
explosion.
(c) Advising Atomic Energy Commission and local
safety and public health authorities.
(d) Preparing immediate press, radio, and television
bulletins, . giving necessary precautions and reassurance as indicated.
(e) Alerting community hospital facilities as directed
by phusician.
	
3.2.2	 Health Physics Group	 The responsibilities of the
Health Physics Group include:
(a) Closing off radia+.ion area. If contamination is a
factor, the area must be sealed.
(b) If contamination is present, shutting off air con-
ditioning and ventilators insofar as possible.
(c) Beginning immediate radiation survey mapping.
- 27 -
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(d)
contaminated individuals.
(e)
(g)
wipes of individuals, etc.
Assisting medical group in obtaining surveys of
Establishing a decontamination center if needed.
Doing area and personnel wipe tests.
Preparing equipment for collections of body fluids,
3.2.3
	 Medical Group. The responsibilities of the medical group
include:
(a) Providing medical care and necessary hospitaliza-
tion of injured individuals.
(b) Performing other assigned medical functions of the
radiological safety program.
	
3.3	 Preparedness. The check list of the essential items of the
emergency plan should be prepared and used to periodically determine readiness
for a radiological emergency. The current status of each item can be designated
as satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory -- as applicable -•- and appropriate
F	 action taken to achieve the required degree of preparedness.
	
3.4	 Emergency Instrumentation and Equipment. One or more emer-
gency kits containing instrumentation and equipment required in the event of a
radiation accident should be stocked and maintained in readiness at con-
veniently accessible point(s) located outside of the potential contamination
zone. This kit should be specifically marked and kept for the purpose of
emergency monitoring only. The types and quantities of instrumentation and
accessories recommended for these kits are listed in Table 3.1. Specific
- 28 -
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TABLE 3. 1
INSTRUMENTS AND INSTRUMENT ACCESSORIES
Item	 Number Assigned
Ionization chamber- Alpha Survey Meter 2
Portable Alpha Counter (PAC-4G) 6
Cables (PAC-4G) 12
Probes (PAC -4G) 12
Probe Handles (PAC-4G) 6
Cases, Carrying (PAC-4G) 4
GM Portable 6
GM Portable End Window Counter 1
Ionization Chamber--Juno 500 R 3
2 n Internal Gas Flow Counter (PC-3A) 1
Portable Neutron Counter (PNC-1) 1
Wet Plutonium Monitor (WM-1) 1
Air Sampler with Sampling Head (PAS-GE-2) 1 Frr
Dosimeters (100 R) 12
Charger, Dosimeter 1
Standards, Field ( 2 39 Pu) 6
Standards, Calibration Flat Plate ( 239 Pu) 4 t
Sampler, '
 Gas, 3.5 Liters 2
Head Set Earphone 6 r"
Badges, Film 12
- 29 -
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personnel concerned must be thoroughly familiar with the contents of the
kit and with their proper use. All items in the kit must be inspected regularly,
and calibrated, maintained or replaced -- as applicable.
	
3.5	 Practice Drills. Adequate training with practice of the emergency
plan should be conducted every three months. Inspection of the contents of the
emergency kits can be combined with the practice drill and at other times fre-
quently enough to ensure that the instrumentation is functioning and properly
calibrated.
4. HANDLING AND STORAGE -- IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Following are the immediate emergency procedures to be followed in the
event of a radiation accident involving the radioactive material capsule of a
SNAP-27 and occurring during. its handling or storage within the custodial
L
activity.
	
4.1
	 Determination of the Existence of an Accident.
	 , a
4.1.1
	 Criteria. For the purposes of this manual any one of
the following occurrences shall be considered indicative of the existence of a
radiation accident involving plutonium (alpha) contamination:
(a) Positive results of surface contamination checks
(Section 3.4.2 of Volume I) .
(b) Positive results (excluding radioactivity)
of airborne radioactivity measurements (Section 3.4.3 of Volume I) .
Vic)	 Positive results of leak-testing of radioactive
material capsule (Section 3. 5 of Volume I) .
(d)	 Alarm from a continuous air monitor for particulate
alpha activity. (Alarm points are set at a level that will permit activities to
m. a.
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proceed without unnecessary interruption to work programs, and still warn
of potentially hazardous concentrations of airborne activity. In areas
where the natural background of the monitor is low and relatively stable,
the alarms are set at the count rate equivalent to a concentration of 1 MPC.
Where the monitor background is high and fluctuates frequently, the alarm
settings are set high enough to avoid unnecessary alarms):1	 (e) Impact which may have damaged the source
	
1
	 capsule.
	
(f)	 Fire or explosion which may have involved the, 	
3
	
II
	
source capsule.	
r,
(g) Visual evidence of radioactive material escaping
,p^
or having leaked from the source capsule.
(h) Any positive evidence of SNAP-27 radioactive
material outside of the sealed capsule, or any accident or condition which
results or which threatens to result in the escape of radioactive material from
the capsule.
	
n 	 4.1 .2	 Action. Subsequent action required to be taken for theq	 q
purposes of protecting health and of minimizing danger to life and property
are dependent on available data or on judgment. Regardless of the magnitude
of the actual or potential accident, rapid response is essential. The con-
sequences	 of an apparently trivial incident are sometimes more serious than
	 PP	 Y
at first suspected. Rapid and efficient handling of minor situations will also
r	 ore seriousp ovide excellent training for a well directed effort in a m 	us 
In all cases, the most important immediate actions are aimed at preventing
or minimizing inhalation of airborne radioactivity and the spread of
contamination.
- 31 -
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4.2
	
Emergency Alarms.
Distinguishing emergency alarms signals should be established
for building and site evacuation, fire, and air raid. These O =rms should be
audible at any location in the facility. Periodic testing of the alarm signals
is recommended to insure that the system is operating and to periodically
remind personnel what each signal means.
	
4.3
	 Evacuation of Area and Immediate Actions.
4.3.1
	
Evacuation Route and Assembly Area. The emergency
plan of each custodial activity shall indicate the specific evacuation route(s)
to be used and the area(s) in which the evacuees are to assemble. The
assembly areas shall be so chosen that the probability of their being involved
in the contaminating event is very remote.
4.3.2	 Scram Rule. Evacuation is to be according to the scram
rule, which states that all persons shall evacuate the radiation area with all
possible speed upon notification or if events "seem" to get out of control. It
is advisable, while scramming, to shout an alert to other people in the area
who may not be aware of the situation. Each person involved will be in-
doctrinated in the importance of the scram rule.
4.3.3 Actions. After persons involved have been evacuated,
carry out the following actions as rapidly and as simultaneously as possible.
(a) Close off the area.
(b) Notify authorities (See Section 4.4 below) .
(c) Have persons remain in assembly area(s) until they
have been checked for contamination and if necessary, decontaminated. The
- 32 -
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assembly area should not present a radiological problem.
	
Unnecessary
tracking of contamination may result if they go off to different areas.Y
Additionally, it is important to ascertain that a radiological hazard	 does a
not exist in the assembly area.
exhaust(d)	 Close windows, and shut off  	 fansun-
filtered) and forced-air types of air-conditioning or heating systems. 	 (Air-
co d'tionin	 system controls should be located near entrance to arean i	 g/heatin g	
so that the systems can be readily turned off. 	 The ventilation system should
d	 it fl	 o disperse airborne radioactivitybe so designe  that a	 flows cann t	 isp	 e a	 y g
entire building) .
(e)	 Follow safeguards procedures
	
specified in the
SNAP-27 manual, concerning accessory equipment.
4.4	 Notification of Authorities ._ t
4.4.1
	
Authorities within Custodial Activity.
	
Post "Emergency
^ytl
Notification Instructions" near the radiation area and in all other locations b`
of interest (e.g. , the health physics office) .	 These instructions are to contain
r	 -,
";
the names and telephone numbers (^ffice and home) of individuals and
organizations (e.g. , fire department and dispensary or hospital) to be con-
^,c5
tacted.	 The individuals should include the Radiological Safety Officer, thee,a
group leader responsible for the SNAP-27 and the director or responsible
administrator of the custodial activity.	 Include in the instructions the in- r
rformation to be given by the caller and any other pertinent information. 	 These,
instructions are to be maintained in a current status.,,:
1 S t
^t
4.4.2
	 Local and State Agencies.	 Notify the local, state, and
federal agencies (health, fire or police departments) if required by existing
- 33 -
°at
 ^.r'..,	 a
laws or agreements, or if their assistance is needed. If such notifications
are not immediately necessary, postpone them until a later time.
	
4.4.3	 Atomic Energy Commis ion,
(a)	 Requirement. Criteria. and procedures for notify-
ing the AEC of radiation incidents and of theft or loss of radioactive material
are contained in paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7 of Volume I. For the purposes of
Volume II, however, upon determination of the existence of an accident on
the basis of criteria specified in paragraph 4.1.1 above, the custodial activity
shall immediately notify by telephone and telegraph the appropriate AEC
Regional Compliance Office shown in Appendix A of this volume.
I(b)	 Call for Assistance. If the need exists for out-
side assistance in the corm of advice or of equipment materials, special
services, or trained men, obtain the required assistance in accordance with
procedures in Section 7 below, and also in accordance with any specific
instructions obtained from the AEC Regional Compliance Office notified of the
accident.
	
4.4.4	 News Media. If the accident is severe and especially
if contamination of uncontrolled areas has occurred, notification of the press
area) shall be surveyed for contamination. If no alpha-contamination
instrument is available all possibly exposed persons shall be regarded
as contaminated.
,i
(b)	 Contaminated clothing shall be removed care-
fully and placed in paper bags or on top of large paper sheets designated
for this purpose.
	 Such items shall be set aside for later decontamination or
disposal as radioactive waste -- as applicable.
(c)	 Decontamination of personnel should be carried
out promptly by showering, using commercially available soaps or detergents.
Highly alkaline soaps, abrasives, organic solvents, or cleaners that tend
to increase the permeability of the skin should not be used.
	 Scrub brushes
may be used, but care should be taken that the skin surfaces do not become
abraded.
	 Several separate washing should be performed.
	 Special emphasis
should be given to cleaning of fingernails, toenails, nostrils, scalp, ears, and
the body folds.
(d)	 After body is well washed, check person for
alpha contamination, with a suitable monitoring instrument.
	 Smear wipes
may also be taken, especially if alpha survey instruments a re not available.
Nasal and ear-canal swabs with cotton tipped applicators should also be
used -= if considered appropriate.
(e)	 Small cuts and other breaks in the skin surface
should be sought for carefully, since absorption of plutonium can occur by
this route. Such lesions should be decontaminated after the above washes
by repeated 5-minute scrubs after removal of scabs and crusts.
- 35 -
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M	 Suitable syringes, curved basins and appropriate
irrigating solutions should be readily available for conjunctival irrigation.
The used solutions should be saved for counting, preferably n separateY	 p 
labeled bottles marked as to order of collection.
(g)	 Issue to decontaminated persons replacement
clothing (known to be uncontaminated) from the emergency stock on hand.M
(h)	 Bioassay Samples. Arrange forg	 the collection of
urine and fecal samples from contaminated persons, as indicated below:
(1) !quantitative collection of urine for the
w
	
	
first 72-hours for assay of plutonium. Each day's specimenspecimens should be put in
a separate container. These specimens may be collected in plastic bottles
containing 10 ml of dilute nitric acid (approximately
r PP	 y 10 ml of concentrated
nitric acid per liter of water) for each 24-hour specimen. An additional 10 mlr
of concentrated nitric acid should be added to t$-
	
	 he specimens after the collec-
tion is complete.
(2) Feces collected for the first 72-hours for
determination of radioactivity. Each day's specimens should be put in a
separate container. These can be collected in round, 1-quart (1-liter) ice
cream containers.
(3) Store collected specimens of urine and feces
under refrigeration and keep them until arrangements can be , made for plutonium
analysis at a qualified laboratory.
(i)	 Arrange, through the medical department, to have
contaminated persons be given surveys of the total body with sensitive alpha and
f
beta-gamma instruments.
P 
	 .z
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1W	 Record the following information immediately in
an appropriate log; person, date, time, instrument, initial reading, final
reading (after each decontamination), and any pertinent remarks.
4.5.2	 First Rid. Prompt attention to persons ` 'io sustain
physical injuries (e.g., burns, fractures, wounds, etc.) is the first
responsibility of the physician and others , at the scene of the accident after
the patients have been surveyed for contamination. If patient is contaminated,
the physician and members of the medical team will have to observe applicable
precautions during time of emergency first aid.
4.6
	
Emergency Survey.
4.6.1	 Scope. The radioactive suurce is now confined by
having closed windows and doors, having shut off the ventilating/heating
system, and having sealed other openings with wide masking tape or with
adhesive tape and heavy wrapping paper. Entrance to the sealed-off area shall
be prohibited. No immediate attempt shall be made to decontaminate areas
at this time. The purpose of this initial emergency survey is to determine the
extent and magnitude of airborne and surface contamination in those areas of
ispecific interest outside of the sealed area. Such areas to survey include
the Evacuation assembly areas and any other suspected areas which are
occupied by persons--off-site areas included. Persons carrying out this
survey shall be equipped with appropriate type protective clothing and
respiratory equipment.
4.6.2	 Procedures.
(a)	 Immediately survey all occupied areas concerned
for airborne and surfacelutonium contamination. Alpha survey instrumentsP	 P	 Y
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are required for surface contamination surveys. Air samples should be
collected on a filter paper with a high volume air sampler. Observe radiation
control principles and be alert to potential hazards other than radiation.
(b)	 Take necessary actions indicated by the results
of the survey, including evacuation of personnel to an alternate assembly
area, sealing off additional areas, and establishing radiological controls.
(c)	 Assay	 the airborne particulate samples for alpha
activity as soon as possible using appropriate type counter and analytical
techniques.
Air samples collected on filter paper will contain the decay prod;-;cts of
naturally occurring radon and thoron.	 These daughter products are frequently
present in sufficient quantities to mask the long lived activity being investi-
gated.	 For the purpose of this survey, however, an immediate count should
be made of the alpha activity on the collected samples.	 The results of the
immediate count should be considered qualitative and conservative (i.e., on the
safe side) when used to define the initial conditions.
Since the longest lived naturally occurring contaminant collected on the filters
is ThB (212Pb) with a half-life of 10.64-hours, the long lived activity can be
obtained by measurement after the ThB has decayed or by taking two measure-
ments spaced in time adequate for significant decay of the ThB. 	 The true
count rate of the long lived alpha emitter is then computed by using the follow-
ing equation:
N2 - N1 e -a At
A =
-^ At1 
-ei
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where:
A	 =	 counting rate of long lived alpha emitter
N 1	 =	 counting rate of sample 4 to 6 hours after sample
is taken (to allow for decay of radon daughters)
x	 =	 decay constant for ThB ( 212Pb) = 6.5 x 10 -2 hr-1
• Ot	 =	 time interval in hours between measurements
N 2	 =	 counting rate of sample 10 to 24 hours after
sample is taken.
Compute the results in terms of pCi/cc of air and compare them with the
applicable limits for airborne plutonium. If these concentrations exceed the
MPC, corrective action should be instituted and respiratory protection pro-
vided in accordance with Section 2.3.3.
(d)	 Enter results of survey immediately on area maps
or in a log noting the date, time, instrument, reading, area, and any pertinent
jremarks. A complete diary of the entire accident should be kept with the events
of the day entered as they occur.
5. TRANSPORATION -- IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Following are the immediate emergency procedures to be followed in the
event of a radiation accident involving the fuel material capsule of a SNAP-27
and occurring during its transporation by air, land, or sea.
5.1	 Determination of the Existence of a Radiation Accident.
For the purposes of this manual, any one of the occurrences
listed in paragraph 4. 1.1 shall be considered indicative of the existence of a
- 39 -
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;-a•iiation accident. Failure of the transporting vehicle to reach its
de,; .1nation within the scheduled arrival period is treated below in Section
6, "Lost Capsule -- Detection and Recovery. "
5.2	 Immediate Action.
5.2..,
	Action by First Observers. Following are actions to be
taken by first observers at the accident scene, pendinc; arrival of authorities:
(a)	 Major consideration at the scene of the accident,
commensurate with personnel safety, shall be the saving of any personnel
involved in the accident.
	 These personnel may be aircraft pilot and crew, truck
drivers, escorts, etc.
	 Except for the saving of lives, keep away from the
wreckage, material, or container involved. 	 Remain upwind and uphill; and sta yY
out of smoke, mist, dust, or other visible substances that are airborne.
(b)	 Report the accident as quickly as possible to the
nearest local authority (police, fire, health, etc.) and notify the nearest AEC
or military installation. 	 Supply sufficient information so authority can take
proper action.	 Give location of accident in sufficient detail so that it can be
easily located.	 Briefly describe kind of accident, if there are any personnel
casualties, and if it is suspected	 known) that radioactive material has
escaped from the capsule.	 It is important to distinguish between information
suspected and information known from actual observation.
	 Fully identifiy
self and state how you can be contacted.
	 As appropriate, give identification
and teleph- rie number of authority who can be contacted at or, near accident
scene.
(c)	 Organize witnesses to warn sightseers to stay
well away 500 yards or more--and upwind from the accident..^f
^10 -
(d) Stay out of Fmoke, mist, dust, or other visible
substances that are airborne. If there is a fire, stay out of the smoke except for
the purpose of rescuing people. Always approach the accident scene from
upwind and from uphill, if possible, and if the smoke cannot be avoided, use
any immediately available method to prevent smoke from affecting your eyes
and ,hroat. Although there may be a toxic, caustic, or radioactive material in
the smoke, short excursions into the smoke are not likely to have serious
effects on the person exposed. If it has proved necessary to enter the smoke
from a fire, report subsequently to the AEC or military emergency team for
radiological monitoring and possible decontamination.
(e) Do not try to fight a fire--except under the
direction of fire fig:lting personnel.
Ir
	
	
(f)	 People who have been in the area affected.by
the accident may have become contaminated and should 'be held in some near-
by place for examination by the AEC or military emergency team before they are
released. If they will not stay, obtain their names, addresses, telephone
numbers, and occupations and give the information to the emergency personnel
or local authorities when they arrive.
(g) Do not permit people to handle debris or take
souvenirs from the accident scene.
(h) Do not permit entry into the accident area by un-
authorized persons. Turn over control at the accident scene only to properly
identified authorities.
NOTE; Small, wallet-size cards bearing a summary of these instructions may
be provided to transporting personnel for carrying with them. Extra cards may
be distributed toersons at accident scene as appropriate.  See A endixA	 ^AP	 B.
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5.2.2
	 Action by Fire, Police and Emergency Services Pending
	
J
Arrival of Special Teams. Fullowing are actions to be taken by fire, police,
and emergency services pending arrival of special, radiological emergency
teams:
(a)	 Rescue and assist injured personnel as practicable.
	 t
(h)	 Notify nearest military installation or Atomic
Energy Commission office of the accident (and of the type of vehicle involved)
and give them any information available as to whether the radioactive material
is, or could be, involved. They will, in turn, dispatch their own men to the
scene of the accident and notify the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating
Center at Albuquer lue, New Mexico, as a ppropriate. Pending arrival of the
special team, the installation called will provide advice regarding the incident.
(c) Clear area of all non
-essential personnel to a
	
R.;
distance of at least 500 yards or more. Maintain exclusion of the area until	 t,
arrival of the radiological assistance team.
(d) If there is a fire and if the ground shipping container
is not engulfed in flames, attempt to extinguish fire in the normal manner (from
upwind side only) . Keep ground shipping container cool by a pplication of water
spray. Stop spraying of water, however, if it accelerates burning. Do not use
foam on ground shipping container where it will act 0 trap heat inside. Foam
	
is an insulator and may act to retain sufficient heat to cause rupture of the 	
=ry:
capsule and subsequent release of radioactive material.'
(e) If the *round shipping container is engulfed in
flames, clear all personnel out of area, to at least 500 yards. Do not attempt
	
°$r
to fight fires.
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1(f)	 Avoid smoke and clear downwind areas; but
if dense smoke must be encountered for long periods of time, dust filtering
masks, goggles, or breathing apparatus should be used. The nonavail-
ability of these items should not hold up rescue efforts. Always approach
the accident scene from upwind and from uphill, if possible, and if the
smoke cannot be avoided, use any immediately available method to pre-
vent smoke from affecting your eyes and throat. Personnel who have entered
°	 the accident area must report to the special team for monitoring and, if
necessary, decontamination after initial action is over.
(g)
	
After the burning has subsided, and if the
special team has not arrived:
(1) Do not attempt to clean up the scene of the
accident.
(2) Do not permit re-entry into scene of
accident by anyone. Rope off scene in a semi-permanent manner.
(3) Organize all personnel that may have
been contaminated to preclude the spreading of plutonium about the environs
and so that they can be monitored by the special team on arrival.
(h)	 Follow advice of the special radiological team
upon its arrival.
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5.3	 Notification of Authorities.
5.3.1	 Shipper (Custodial Activity) . When a radiation accident has
occurred enroute, the chief transporting person, or the official escort, shall
as promptly as possible notify by "collect" telephone call the specific official(s)
of the shipper (custodial activity) listed in the written instructions furnished to
him. The caller should state the nature of the accident, the exact location of
the accident scene, how he may be contacted by telephone, and any other
pertiner.. details.
NOTE: Similarly, this same official is to be notified in advance, if an un-
avoidable delay (not involving a radiation accident) will prevent arrival of the
shipment at its destination point within the scheduled period.
5.3.2	 Local and State Agencies. See paragraph 4.4.2 above.
5.3.3 Atomic Energy Commission and Others. Immediately
upon notification of the occurrence of a radiation accident, the designated
official of the custodial activity shall notify other specified officials of that
activity and he shall also notify by telephone and telegraph the appropriate
AEC Regional Compliance Office listed in Appendix A. The appropriate
representative of the activity to which the shipment was being sent should
also be- notified by telephone.
On the basis of requirements foreseen,the designated official of the custodial
activity shall promptly dispatch appropriate radiological assistance to the
scene of the accident. If the need exists for outside assistance in the form
of advice or of equipment, materials, special services, or trained men, obtain
the required assistance in accordance with procedures in Section 7 below,
1	 -44-
1
and also in accordance with any specific instructions obtained from the
AEC Regional Compliance Office notified of the accident. A call for
radiological assistance should also be made to the activity to which the
shipment was being sent, especially if the activity has such capabilities
and is located near the accident scer.e.
5.3.4	 News Media. See paragraph 4.4.4 above.
6. LOST CAPSULE -- DETECTION AND RECOVERY
As soon as it is known, or reasonably presumed, that a SNAP-27 fuel
capsule has been lost, the cognizant activity shall care v out the following
actions:
(a) Notify the appropriate AEC Regional Compliance
Office, listed in Appendix A.
(b) Formulate a plan and prepare to conduct a
systematic and thorough search, using visual and appropriate instrumental
means. As appropriate, assistance it me form of advice, instruments,
services, and trained personnel may be requested from the Radiological
Emergency Assistance Organization. See Section 7 below.
(c) If the capsule has been lost as a consequence of
an actual, or reasonably presumed, crash of an airplane transporting it;
immediately request assistance for detection and recovery from the Radiological
Assistance Organization. For emergency procedures at the-accident scene,
see Section 5 above.
(d) Detailed procedures for the detection and re-
covery of a lost SNAP-27 capsule are contained in a separate manual
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7.	 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
ti.
11.
7.1
	 Sources and Types of Assistance.
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense
are the primary sources of radiological emergency assistance. Emergency
teams are available at thirty-nine facilities of the AEC and at more than 330
military installations of the DOD. The considerable resources of AEC and DOD
are further supplemented by those of ten other Federal agencies which partici-
pate in the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. These agencies are listed
in Appendix C. Under certain circumstances a request for assistance may be
amply met by simply giving proper advice. To the extent considered appropriate,
however, radiological assistance from the AEC may '.nclude: radiological
monitoring; emergency sampling and radiation monitoring of materials including
air, food, and water; radiological decontamination advice and emergency .
assistance; medical advice on the handling and treatment of people exposed to
radiation or radioactive material; special laboratory services needed for the
evaluation of personnel radiation exposure and environmental radiological
hazards; and specialists in radiation accident operations. If the emergency
situation warrants it the AEC from its laboratories and production plants, could
bring a considerable amount of additional resources to the task of protecting
health and safety.Y
q	 7.2
	 Call for Radiological
_	 Qical Emergency Assistance.
,
	
	 7.2.1
	 Atomic Energy Commission. To request radiological
assistance, call the appropriate AEC Regional Office for Radiological Assistance
listed in Appendix D. The telephone number listed for each of the eight
regional offices is a special one to receive requests for radiological emergency
assistance,t , at any hour of any day.
r	 "
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7.2.2	 Department of Defense. Even though a request for
radiological assistance has been made to the AEC, if the situation warrants it
and assistance may be obtained quicker from a military installation because
of its proximity to the accident scene, make an immecdate request for such
assistance from this installation. A radiological assistance team from the
military installation, properly equipped to handle the situation, will arrive
promptly and, with assistance of local. police (as applicable), will assume
command of the situation until arrival of the AEC team.
7.3	 AEC Team Functions.
When the AEC team arrives at the accident scene, its functions,
in general, will be to:
r
(a)	 Monitor for radiation to evaluate the hazard and
determine the emergency measures needed to protect health and safety.
' i
	
	(b)	 Coordinate the emergency operations in cooperation
with local authorities a;: the scene.
c	 Provide information for the public..O	 P
(d)	 Provide emergency medical advice and, if necessary
to save life or minimize injury, carry out emergency measures to assist
people who may be injured as a result of the accident.
However, when a more appropriate authority arrives at the ,scene, the AEC team
captain will relinquish control of the emergency operations to this authority.
- 47 -
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8. POST-EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS
	
8.1	 Responsibility.
When the emergency period is over, the agency responsible for
the radioactive material, the site, or the facilities involved would be ex-
pected to provide for the necessary post-emergency decontamination and
f	 recovery operation, unless this responsibility has been accepted by someone
else. Atomic Energy Commission radiological emergency assistance, however,
will not be withdrziwn from the scene until appropriate steps have been taken
to give reasona'-)le assurance that the public health and safety will be pro-
tected from any remaining potential hazards.
	
8.2	 Contamination Control.
Following are procedures which are to be applied as appropriate
to prevent unnecessary exposures and dispersal of the contaminant.
(a) The contamination area shall be duly secured, as
appropriate, by such means as physical barriers, posted radiation signs,
guards, etc. , to insure against unauthorized entry.
(b) Contamination control point(s) shall be estab-
lished as required. En ry to and exit from the contamination area shall be
only via such points.
(c) Persons authorized to enter the contamination
area shall be appropriately fitted with complete protective respiratory equip-
ment and with protective (anti-contamination) clothing including head cover,
shoe covers, gloves, and coveralls.
8
is
1
1
(d)	 Upon exiting from the contamination area, persons
shall discard their protective equipment and clothin-j, be checked for coii-
tamination and decontaminated if required. Contaminated items shall be
handled accordingly.
() Anye	 item removed from the contamination area
shall be treated as being contaminated -. unless proved otherwise by an
actual check a the control
	  tp int. e 
	
8.3	 Recovery of Radioactive Material.
The radioactive material, or the recoverable bulk of it, will be
re=rered in accordance with specific instructions contained in a separate
SNAP-27 manual. This function, in essence, constitutes the first phase of
the decontamination procedures.
	
8.4	 Decontamination of Area and Eciuipment.
(a) The first phase of decontamination is the recovery
operation indicated in paragraph 8.3 above.
(b) Subsequent decontamination operations shall
	
It	 be well-planned beforehand, with the same care as used in bacteriological
handling .of virulent organisms. The decontamination method(s), equipment,
materials, and supplies :shall be chosen in accordance with the clean-up
task at hand. The appropriate types and quantities of protective respiratory
equipment, protective clotting, radiation survey and monitoring instrumenta-
tion, waste containers accessoi, - equipment, and supplies, etc.,, must be at
	
.	 hand. Additionally, appropriate  rovisions must be made for the form volumeY P 	, 	 ,
and radioactivity of the wastes expected. As applicable, specific advice
should be obtained from the AEC team at the accident scene or from the
- 49 -
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appropriate AEC Regional Office for Radiological Assistance, listed in
Appendix D.
M
	 Persons assigned to decontamination operations
shall have had prior training and ex perience, or else they shall be fully
briefed before hand on all particulars involved and work under the direct
supervision of a qualified person.
(d)	 Fans or ventilating Systems shall not be turned
on to try and blow away the contamination. Such an action
will only result
in dispersal of the contaminant to others areas, causing additional and
perhaps more serious radiological problems than the one at hand.
8.5
	 Radioactive Waste.
8.5.1
	 Packaged RadioactiveWaste. Radioac*° waste result-
ing from the decontamination operations shall be packaged ana labelled in
accordance with applicable regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
As arranged beforehand, such packages shall be transferred to an appropriately
AEC-licensed facility, for either ultimate disposal by ground burial or for
recovery of the plutonium, as a pplicable. Trans portation of the packages shall
be made in conformance with re gulations of the applicable regulatory agency
such as the AEC and ICC (e.g. Interstate Commerce Commission) .
8.5.2
	 Effluents. Radioactive effluents resulting from de-
contamination o p
erations, in the form of gases or liquids, discharged to the
environment (or via the sanitary sewerage system) shall be controlled in
accordance with applicable provisions of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations,
Part 20 (10 CFR 20) . Likewise, requirements for records, reports, and notifi-
cations concerning such effluents shall be as s pecified in 10 C,FR 20.
-50-
8.6
	 Follow-Up Bio-Medical Functions.
Medical care of injured persons shall be carried out as deter-
mined by responsible medical authorities. On the basis of expert advice,
a pplicable therapeutic means may be taken to hasten elimination of plutonium
from the body. As advised by experts consulted continue to collect samples
of excreta (urine, feces) from exposed persons and to have them radioassayed.
Likewise, whole-body counts may be performedY	 A	 ed to determine the lung- or body-
burden.
9.	 RECORDS
z
	
	
As indicated above, written records shall be maintained of all findings,
reports, and other items pertinent to the radiation accident. These records
should be supplemented, if applicable, by such items as photographs,
sketches, etc. Records for the post-emergency period shall be as specified
in Volume I, and in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20 (10 CFR 20) .
Complete and accurate documentation of the emergency conditions and actions
taken should be an invaluable aid in determining the consequences of a future
t	 similar occurrence and in the preparation of emergency procedures for such
incidents.
a>
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
COMPLIANCE OFFICES'
Region	 Address	 Te lophone
I	 Connecticut, Delaware,	 Region I	 (212) 989-10(10
District of Columbia, Maine, 	 Division of Compliance Ext. 281
Maryland, Massachusetts, 	 USAEC
New Hampshire, New jersey, 	 376 Hudson Street
New York, Pennsylvania,	 New York, N.Y. 10014
Rhode Island, and Vermont
II Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 	 Region II	 (404) 526-5791
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana , Division of Compliance
Mississippi, North Carolina, 	 USAEC
Panama Canal Zone, Puerto	 50 Seventh Street, N.E.
Rico, South Carolina, 	 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Tennessee, Virginia, Virgin
Islands, and West Virginia
III Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 	 Region III	 (312) 654-1680
Michigan, Minnesota,	 Division of Compliance (nights and
Missouri, Ohio, and	 USAEC	 holidays:
Wisconsin	 Suite 410	 257-7711
Oakbrook Professional 	 Ext. 541)
Building
Oakbrook, Illinois
IV Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, 	 Region IV
	
(303) 297-4211
Montana, Nebraska, New	 Division of Compliance (nights and
Mexico, North Dakota, 	 USAEC
	
holidays:
Oklahoma, South Dakota,
	
10395 West Colfax Ave. 237-5095)
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming 	 Denver, Colorado 80215
V Alaska, Arizona, California,
	 Region V	 (415) 841-5620
Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon,
	
Division of Compliance
Washington and U. S.
	 USAEC
Territories and Possessions	 2111 Bancroft Way
in the Pacific	 Berkeley, California
* Appendix D of l OCFR2 0
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APPENDIX D
CARDS CONTAINING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
As indicated in Section 5.2. 1, small (wallet-size) cards bearing a summary
of the immediate emergency procedures should be provided to transporting
personnel for carrying with them.	 These cards may be distributed to
persons at an accident scene, as appropriate.
	
Below is a suggested for-
mat for such a card.	 Specific information left blank is to be filled out by the
custodial activity holding responsibility for the shipment.
IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
1	 1. Keep away from the immediate accident scene, except
! to rescue people.
2. Report accident immediately to nearest military or AEC
installation; to local police or fire department; and to
f
custodial activity. 	 See Reverse side of card.
3. Keep sightseers well away - 500 yards or more -and
upwi;id from accident.
IT 4. DO NOT FIGHT FIRES except as directed by firemen.
5. Stay out of smoke, dust, or mists resulting from
accident.
6. Hold for radiation monitoring and/or obtain names,
addresses and phone numbers of all persons who were
in the affected area.
7. Do not take or permit the taking of souvenirs.
8. Turn over control only to properly identified authories.
See Reverse Side -
B-1
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IN THEEVENT OF A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGE
CONTACT:
A. Local Police or Fire Department.
B. Local AEC Installation:
i C.	 Local Military Installation:
D.	 Custodial Activity: Mr.
j	 At:
Tel, No's:
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL CONCERNED;
	 (No.) Capsule(s) I
{	 of radioisotope thermoelectric generator SNAP-27, each contain-
i
	 ing Plutonium-238 (an alpha emitter).
- See Reverse Side -
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APPENDIX C
AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
ON RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE
OFFICERS:	 Chairman	 . . . . . . . .	 AEC
1 st Vice-Chairman . . . . . . . . .
	
DOD
2nd Vice-Chairman . . . . . . . . . 	 DHEW
Secretary . . . . n . . . . . . . . 	 AEC
PARTICIPATING AGENCIES:
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Department of Defense (DOD)
Department of Health, Education and Walfare (DHEW)
Department of Argriculture
Department of Commerce (U.S. Weather Bureau)
Department of Labor
Federal Aviation Agency
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization
Post Office Department
Treasury Department (U.S. Coast Guard)
General Services Administration
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APPENDIX  D
AEC REGIONAL OFFICES FOR RADIOLOGICAL ASPISTANCE
'	 1M NI.0	 Q	 1NIW
•
fto Qf u farm 91rlIpkamfor meWann
nnn
: 0
I. New York...... 376 Hudson St,, N"w Yukon i1- 1000........, 212
York 14, N.Y.
2. Oak Ridge...... P.O. Box E, Oak Ridge, 483-881-1, ext. 7807 or 616
Tenn. 483-7488.
3. Savannah River. P.O. Box, A, Aiken, S.C. Aiken, B.C., Midway 803
9-6211, ext. 3338.
Augusta, Ga., Park : 404
4-8311, ext. 3333.
4. Albuquerque.... P.O. Box 6400, Albu. 2664411, ext. 38287.... 606
querque, N. Max.
'	 6. Chlosgo........ 9800 S. Casa Ave., Clearwater 7=3711, ext. 312'
Argonne, III. 2111 or 641.
6. Idabo.......... P.O. Box 2108, Idabo • Jackson 2. 6640........ 208
Falls, Ido,^, ►,
7. San Francisco... 2111 Bancroft Way, Thornwall 1-6820...... 416
Berkeley, Calif.
S. Richland........ P.O. Box 660, Richland, 942-1111, ext.6- 6441.... bt
Wanh.
Joint Nuclear Sandi ,►
 Buse, Albuquer. 266-1411, ext. 3812%.... 6t.►
Accident Co. que, N. Mex.
ordination
Center
(JNACC). D-1 
